PERERA, DEEPAK KAMANI, JAMES WANJIGI
Ref: A. 2-28-06 Hoover-Pratt e-mail, with attached
"Githongo dossier", B. 05 Nairobi 3446
Classified by Econ Counselor John Hoover for reasons 1.4
(B) and (D).
1. (S) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Nairobi hereby
seeks security advisory opinions under section 212(F) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, Proclamation 7750,
suspending entry into the United States of the following
individuals:
-- Alfred Getonga,
-- Anura Perera,
-- Deepak Kamani,
-- Joseph "Jimmy" Wanjigi.
Ref B is Embassy Nairobi's request for the suspension of
entry into the U.S. (subsequently approved by the
Department) of former Minister Christopher Murungaru for
his central role in a number of grand-scale corruption
cases under the administration of Kenyan President Mwai
Kibaki. This cable should be read in conjunction with ref
B, as it expands the case used against Murungaru to include
chief co-conspirators Getonga, Perera, Kamani, and Wanjigi.
All were central figures in a network of corrupt government
officials and private sector dealmakers that has
systematically stolen, or attempted to steal, a cumulative
sum as high as $700 million over the past three years by
exploiting a secretive system of government security-
related procurement contracts in Kenya. These activities
have had a serious adverse effect on U.S. national
interests in Kenya, which include strengthening democratic
institutions and the rule of law and fostering economic
development. This cable also draws heavily on, and should
be read in conjunction with, ref A. Ref A is the first-
hand account detailing high-level graft and cover-up in the
Kibaki administration made available to the public in
January 2006 by John Githongo, the President's anti-
corruption advisor who went into self-imposed exile in
February 2005. The so-called Githongo dossier is a
credible and detailed account documenting graft and cover-
up on the part of the aforementioned individuals. Embassy
reporting and significant flows of sensitive intelligence
corroborate Githongo's revelations. With indictments
looming, the Government of Kenya has ordered in recent days
that all four men surrender their passports and any
personal firearms they may possess. Further, the Kenya
Anti-Corruption Authority strongly supports visa revocation
against the four individuals in light of the Commission's
own evidence of wrongdoing.
2. (S) Getonga has a valid B1/B2 visa expiring July 21,
2006; Kamani has a valid B1/B2 visa expiring May 14, 2006;
Wanjigi has previously held visas, the latest being an A2
which expired in 2003. Getonga, Kamani, and Wanjigi are
Kenyan nationals; Perera's nationality is unknown at this
time. Post recommends Getonga, Perera, Kamani, and Wanjigi
be found ineligible under Presidential Proclamation 7750.
Please advise ASAP. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.
ANATOMY OF A CORRUPTION NETWORK
-------------------------------
3. (C) In April 2004, information emerged publicly that a
shadowy firm, Anglo Leasing and Finance Limited (Anglo
Leasing), had secured two bogus contracts with the
Government of Kenya (GOK). The first was for the supply of
new secure passport issuing equipment, and the second for
the construction of a police forensics lab. Together, the
two contracts were worth a combined $90 million. Anglo-
Leasing, it turned out, was no more than a "PO Box company"
with fictitious offices in the UK and Switzerland and no
identifiable officers or management. The Anglo-Leasing
scandal was aggressively investigated at the time by the
then-Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Governance, John
Githongo. Githongo's investigations revealed Anglo-Leasing
to be only the tip of an iceberg of grand-scale theft.
They forced the Ministry of Finance to suspend payments and
order forensic audits on 18 secretive security-related
procurement contracts that followed a very similar pattern
to that found in the Anglo-Leasing cases.
4. (C) This pattern involved a small clique of private-
sector dealmakers working together with an equally small
cadre of senior government conspirators. Together, they
would generate proposals for large-scale government
procurement contracts. Because these contracts involved
national security equipment of one kind or another, they
fell well outside the normal (and already weak) systems of
scrutiny and oversight found in other parts of the GOK and
Parliament. The proposals frequently requested goods not
needed or desired by the line ministry targeted to pay for
them, and involved large upfront payments or commissions
financed by loans arranged by the businessmen. The goods
or services were either vastly overpriced or not supplied
at all. This kind of scam generated enormous illicit
profits, much of which were recycled by the businessmen who
received the payments to the concerned GOK officials and
other middlemen for personal gain or to finance future
political campaigns.
5. (C) Githongo resigned from his position following
several death threats in February 2005, and has been living
in self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom ever since.
During his time in exile, however, Githongo consolidated
all of the evidence at his disposal and began on January
22, 2006, to release portions of it to the Kenyan public
through the nation's largest daily newspaper. His now-
public 19-page summary dossier of evidence paints a
convincing, coherent, and credible picture of the
activities of the corruption network described above.
Moreover, both in its details and overarching narrative,
his account is strongly corroborated time and again by the
Embassy's own reporting, as well as sensitive reporting in
other channels dating to mid-2004.
6. (S) Githongo's summary dossier directly implicates
Murungaru, Getonga, Perera, Kamani, and Wanjigi, as well as
others, as the core drivers of the corruption network that
generated the Anglo-Leasing and similar scandals. Getonga
used his position as Personal Assistant to the President to
connect Perera and Kamani, the two private sector
dealmakers (who had operated for years doing similar deals
under the previous administration), to Murungaru and other
complicit senior-level officials in the Kibaki
administration. In turn, Wanjigi, the son of a former
Minister and nephew of a Permanent Secretary already
arrested for his involvement in Anglo Leasing, was the
local middleman, channeling contracts and payments in both
directions as the bogus procurement scams were consummated.
ALFRED GETONGA
--------------
7. (S) As Personal Assistant to the President, Alfred
Getonga used his position in the Office of the President
(OP) to push forward fraudulent contracts in the OP and in
other ministries, and then divert a large portion of these
government resources for political campaign fundraising,
and for personal gain. In Githongo's account, former
Justice Minister Kiraitu Murungi (who has also been
implicated in covering up the Anglo-Leasing scandal) tells
Githongo that nearly all of the suspect contracts Githongo
was investigating were engineered by Alfred Getonga and
others, and that the contracts were designed to raise funds
for the NARC political party under the direction of Getonga
and Murungaru. Githongo's evidence implicating Getonga is
so substantial that he informed President Kibaki of
Getonga's direct involvement in Anglo-Leasing in at least
two separate briefings for the president. Our own reporting
strongly corroborates Githongo's accounts, and the Embassy
acted on it in a similar way. On at least two occasions in
2005, when solicited by President Kibaki for advice and
information in one-on-one meetings, the Ambassador
specifically named Getonga as a significant source of
corruption in Kibaki's administration.
8. (SBU) Since the Githongo report has been published, the
OP has announced publicly that Getonga is no longer
employed there. On February 14, 2006, the Presidential
Press Service announced that Getonga's contract had expired
and would not be renewed.
9. (S) A reliable Embassy source in the telecom sector
recently reported that Getonga was also at the center of
the 11th hour cancellation of the tender for a second
national landline phone operator in Kenya in July 2004.
Thanks to his position, Getonga was aware ahead of time of
the winner. Invoking the President's name, he approached
the company slated to win and successfully solicited the
gratis contribution of 5% of the shares under the pretense
that such a gesture was needed to guarantee winning the
tender. When Kibaki learned of this intrigue through his
son (who was supporting a rival consortium), he angrily
ordered the entire tender cancelled, setting back telecom
reform and service delivery in Kenya by several years.
ANURA PERERA
------------
10. (S) Reliable private sector contacts who have done
business in Kenya for many years regularly cite Anura
Perera as a long-standing corrupt dealmaker whose
activities far pre-date the Anglo Leasing cases. He is
nonetheless very difficult to trace, and has proven a
formidable adversary for law enforcement personnel by
operating indirectly through a network of dummy
corporations in Switzerland, the UK, and elsewhere which
act as conduits for the proceeds of the inflated or
outright bogus procurement contracts he has engineered over
the years. The Githongo dossier, together with sensitive
reporting, nonetheless provides compelling circumstantial
evidence against Perera for his role in a series of
security and military-related procurement scams. In large
part as a result, Perera was ordered by the Kenyan police
to surrender his passport and firearm on February 21, 2006.
(Note: It is unlikely Perera is in Kenya at this time; nor
is it clear what kind of passport he carries or under what
nationality he travels. End note).
11. (S) In the Githongo dossier, an associate of Kamani
and Perera, working from an office building owned by Perera
in Nairobi, is reported to have set up bogus companies,
including Anglo-Leasing, in 1997 for purposes of engaging
in fraudulent government procurement deals. As he was
unraveling the Anglo-Leasing secure passport scam, Githongo
was indirectly threatened by Perera through then-Justice
Minister Murungi. Meeting with Githongo, Murungi cited a
file compiled by a local lawyer whom Murungi stated was
acting on Perera's behalf. He told Githongo that an unpaid
debt owed by his father was really owed to Perera himself.
Githongo explained the connection: Murungi "warned me to
'go easy' on 'our friends' Murungaru and Alfie (Getonga)...
The message Hon. Kiraitu (Murungi) was communicating very
directly to me was that Mr. Perera wanted me to to 'turn
off the heat'" so that his father's debt could be "settled
amicably."
12. (S) Githongo's report goes on to reference "an
assortment of reliable sources, including within the Kenyan
military" who told Githongo that "Perera was involved in a
range of questionable projects in the defense and security
sector and had developed a reputation for paying sizable
kickbacks." Perera, for example, is widely believed to be
at the center of the Nexus project, a military
communications complex on the southern outskirts of
Nairobi. Three years after the $36.9 million project was
completed, the Kenyan military has yet to occupy the
complex. The Kenyan Department of Defense (KDOD) tender
committee, which should have overseen implementation of
such a large contract, has publicly denied ever being aware
of it. KDOD sources told Embassy DAO in mid-2005 that the
project was likely without any specific military purpose or
plan in mind, but rather for personal gain on the part of
top military brass. Perera's connection is through another
phantom European company, Nedermar BV Technologies, for
which there is no information on the internet. It won the
secretive contract to build the communications center on a
SIPDIS
turn-key basis, but its origins and officers remain a
mystery. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) Director
Aaron Ringera told the Embassy in mid-2005 that he had used
evidence gathered by KACC on the Nexus project to persuade
Kibaki to take action against former Chief of Staff Joseph
Kibwana. (Note: Kibaki went half-way, asking Kibwana to
retire early in August 2005. End note). Judge Ringera
told Econ/C and other diplomats in February 2006 that
Perera was the private sector mastermind behind the Nexus
deal.
13. (S) Perera is also believed to be the mastermind
behind the procurement of a naval frigate for the Kenyan
Navy beginning in 2003. Through a fictitious firm named
Euromarine, Perera arranged $57 million in financing for a
ship constructed in a Spanish shipyard at a cost estimated
to be 3-4 times more than its actual value. The frigate
deal was one of the 18 contracts investigated and audited
after the Anglo-Leasing scandals were revealed and the GOK
has stopped payments on the vessel. Compelling sensitive
reporting places Perera at the very center of the frigate
deal, and in multiple conversations with Embassy officers,
Kenya's Permanent Secretary of Finance has repeatedly
confirmed the facts of the scandal as outlined here.
DEEPAK KAMANI
-------------
14. (S) Deepak Kamani joins Anura Perera as the other
long-standing private sector mastermind of fraudulent
security-related procurement contracts in Kenya over the
years. Kamani family businesses first broke into the
business of exploiting security contracts in the mid-1990s
after forming close ties with the then-Permanent Secretary
of Internal Security in the Office of the President. The
current Permanent Secretary of Finance, who held the same
position at the end of the Moi administration, recently
told the Embassy that Kamani had unnaturally open access to
Treasury officials in the late 1990s, to the point that he
mistakenly believed at one time that Kamani was an employee
of the ministry. When he assumed his current position for
a second time as PS Finance in 2004, this same official
warned counterparts in the Office of the President to cease
doing business with Kamani, but to no avail.
15. (S) Kamani cut his teeth in a multi-million dollar
contract to supply boilers to the Prisons Department in the
early 1990s. The deal continues to be investigated by
Kenya's Auditor General because the boilers supplied were
second hand or unserviceable. Kamani's companies have also
been directly linked to a $25 million contract in 1997 to
supply a digital telecommunications network to the Prisons
Department through LBA Systems, a shell company registered
in Scotland. More than five years after the network was
supposedly installed and commissioned, it remains
inoperable. In a similar case, another shadowy Kamani-
owned company, Infotalent Systems, signed a $36 million
deal to supply telecommunications equipment to the Office
of the President. The deal is believed to be among the 18
suspect contracts frozen by the Minister of Finance in 2004
for forensic audit and investigation.
16. (C) Kamani is directly implicated in the two Anglo-
Leasing scams. He enjoyed close ties and had regular
access to Zakayo Cheruiyot, the Permanent Secretary of
Internal Security who was indicted in February 2005 and is
now on trial for the two Anglo-Leasing cases. Kamani's
sister is named as the director of a company in the UK that
occupies the address given as that of Anglo-Leasing in the
secure passport deal, and his son is listed as director of
a company occupying the address listed as that of Anglo-
Leasing's in the police forensic lab scam. Finally, the
Githongo dossier directly links Kamani to the two Anglo-
Leasing scandals. In his account, Githongo details his
conversation with then-Finance Minister David Mwiraria
about the mysterious return of some of the money paid on
the Anglo-Leasing forensics lab project. Mwiraria, despite
previously claiming not to know who stood behind Anglo-
Leasing, made a "startling admission" which directly
implicated both Kamani and himself when he told Githongo
that the money was only returned after Mwiraria had ordered
an associate to contact Kamani by phone to do so.
JIMMY WANJIGI
-------------
17. (S) Like Getonga, Jimmy Wanjigi's role in the Anglo-
Leasing and similar scandals has been to facilitate and
channel contracts, communication, and money between the
private businessmen like Perera and Kamani on the one hand,
and GOK agencies and officials responsible for procurement
on the other. Like Getonga, he is also a relative newcomer
to high-level graft, having come on the scene following the
2002 electoral victory of Kibaki's coalition. Early in the
Kibaki administration, he traded on his contacts with
members of Kibaki's family (probably without Kibaki's
knowledge) to break into Kamani and Perera's networks, and
to insist on getting a cut from the security-related
procurement scams the latter had become experts in
engineering. One of his first such deals was an extension
of a Kamani-origin contract begun under the previous
administration to supply vehicles to the Office of the
President. The overpriced contract reportedly netted
Wanjigi and Murungaru $5.6 million.
18. (S) Wanjigi also turns up later as a participant in
Perera's massively overpriced naval frigate deal, working
behind the scenes with Perera, Getonga and others to work
out a way to move the deal forward, despite the risk of
public exposure. After the February 2005 resignation of
John Githongo, he is also widely believed to have worked
closely with Getonga to put out a number of false rumors to
discredit Githongo by, for example, circulating rumors and
planting stories in the media alleging that Githongo was a
British spy and a child molester. Githongo himself
believes Wanjigi and Getonga were behind the death threats
that forced him to resign and go into self-imposed exile.
According to Githongo's written account, the very day
Githongo succeeded in having President Kibaki sack some
officials since indicted for their involvement in Anglo-
Leasing, Finance Minister Mwiraria came to Githongo's
office "and warned that Mr. Jimmy Wanjigi had sworn to kill
me."
ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
-----------------------------------------
19. (C) The corruption network that perpetrated the Anglo
Leasing and similar corruption scandals has had serious
adverse effects on three areas of U.S. interests specified
in the proclamation, which are also three of the Embassy's
top Mission Performance Plan (MPP) priorities: promoting
democracy and good governance (starting with the stability
of the government); encouraging sustainable economic
development; and, combating terrorism and transnational
crime.
20. (C) Before coming to power in December 2002, the
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) adopted a "zero-
tolerance" anti-corruption posture. Public expectations
were high that the new government would break with the
corrupt excesses of the Moi administration, and
international donors made plans to help bolster Kenya's
nascent anti-corruption effort. However, by December 2003,
barely a year into NARC's tenure in office, high-level
officials were engaging in precisely the corrupt practices
they had vowed to stop, helped in great part by the
seamless transition into the new administration provided by
Getonga, of the corruption network led on the private
sector side by Kamani, Perera and Wanjigi.
21. (C) The Kenyan Government's ability to successfully
battle corruption touches directly on the legitimacy and
thus the stability of the Government itself. Proper
enforcement of the rule of law is thus central to Kenya's
political and economic development. Getonga, Perera,
Kamani, and Wanjigi are at the heart of a return to a
culture of high-level impunity with respect to mega-
corruption and the rule of law. Such a culture will
maintain a brake on Kenya's efforts at democratic
development, enabling corrupt politicians to retain their
offices and sending a clear message to the next political
generation that corruption and cronyism are the best tools
for career advancement. Because the Government
(specifically President Kibaki) has not demonstrated the
political will to take action against those accused of
corruption, international donor countries working closely
with Kenyan reformers must use whatever tools are at our
disposal to discourage negative behavior.
22. (U) The costs of corruption have a direct macro-
economic impact on Kenya's development. The $700 million
at stake in the subset of corrupt deals investigated by
Githongo alone far exceeds annual donor assistance flows to
Kenya, a country which recently asked the international
community for $230 million in emergency food aid and in
which 56% of the population lives on a dollar a day or
less. Corruption is also a major impediment to greater
domestic and foreign investment in the Kenyan economy.
With little expectation of a level playing field in bidding
for public sector contracts, and without a firm basis in
the rule of law, legitimate investors remain hesitant to
commit large amounts of capital. A recent, credible study
of Kenya's investment climate found that corruption, i.e.,
the need to pay officials when bidding for projects and/or
obtaining permits, adds 6% to business costs in Kenya.
23. (C) Kenya has suffered multiple mass casualty al Qaeda
terrorist attacks in recent years and active al Qaeda
plotting here continues apace. The continuation of high-
level corruption sends the signal that the GOK, and
particularly the security sector, can be bought. For
years, members of the Kenya Police Service were among the
most commonly cited perpetrators of graft. This lack of
adherence to the rule of law may have contributed to the
enabling environment for the successful terrorist attacks
of 1998 and 2002. The Kenyan Police continue to be cited
as the most corrupt institution in public opinion surveys
on corruption. Getonga and others, growing wealthy while
running the nation, set the poorest possible example for a
police force severely damaged by years of corruption. That
the secretive security sector was singled out for corrupt
exploitation is particularly pernicious. Indeed, in the
Githongo dossier, other accomplices are quoted as saying
that they "took advantage of American terrorism-related
fears to expand what was a small project into a cash cow."
COMMENT: MAKING A DIFFERENCE
----------------------------
24. (C) In any discussion with Kenyans concerned about
corruption in their country, there is consistent and
vehement support for U.S. and other third-country actions
to revoke visas of corrupt officials and businessmen. The
prohibition makes a difference, both as a deterrent and as
a punishment. Press speculation that David Mwiraria
resigned from his post as Finance Minister on February 1 to
avoid the possible embarrassment of a visa ban that would
have prevented him from visiting Washington on official
business is probably an exaggeration. But it illustrates
the reality that U.S. visa revocations are a powerful anti-
graft tool in Kenya.
25. (C) In this vein, in a meeting on February 18, KACC
Director Aaron Ringera urged a small group of Western
diplomats to take visa action against corrupt individuals,
including, he emphasized, private sector actors. He then
specifically raised the four individuals who are the
subject of this cable, without any knowledge that Post was
already considering this request to Washington. While we
believe we have chosen the right individuals at this
moment, Post will likely request additional 212(f) visa
revocation actions as more information on Anglo-Leasing-
style corruption scandals come to light in Kenya.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR FINDING
-------------------------------------------
26. (C) Getonga, Perera, Kamani and Wanjigi have not been
informed by post of the fact that Presidential Proclamation
7750, under Section 212 (F) of the INA, may apply to them.
Given the front-page news coverage of former Minister
Nicholas Biwott's (the previous Kenyan government's
corruption counterpart) and former Minister Christopher
Murungaru's refusals and repeated public calls now for
similar actions to be taken against other corrupt officials
here -- it is extremely doubtful that any of them are
unaware of the possible ineligibility.
27. (C) Deepak Kamani (DPOB:03-07-53, Kenya) currently has
a valid B1/B2 visa, which expires on July 29, 2006. He is
believed to have fled Kenya in recent weeks, and may pose a
flight risk to the U.S. Alfred Getonga (DPOB: 01-08-63,
Kenya) currently has a valid B1/B2 visa, which expires on
May 24, 2006. Jimmy Wanjigi (DPOB: 01-09-57, Kenya) does
not have a currently valid U.S. visa. He received an A2
visa in 2003 when he participated in a trip to the U.S. by
former President Moi, but that visa has since expired.
Anura Perera's background remains shrouded in mystery, and
Post will send additional background information when it
becomes available from other diplomatic sources and/or the
KACC. There is no visa information available on the
Consular Consolidated Database for anybody by this name.
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
28. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Because of the serious and far-
reaching nature of their corrupt activities, Post
recommends that Alfred Getonga, Anura Perera, Deepak
Kamani, and Joseph Wanjigi be found ineligible under
Presidential Proclamation 7750 for travel to the U.S. and
that no exception be granted. Please advise ASAP.
Bellamy
WikiLeaks
