Classified By: PolCouns Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Reasons: 1.4 (B,C,D)
SUBJECT: Kenya Gets a New Intelligence Chief
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kibaki's January 16 removal of
Brigadier (ret.) Boinett as head of Kenya's National
Intelligence Service (NSIS) removes the USG's main ally in
the counter-terror struggle and one of the few remaining true
professionals at the highest level of the Kenyan Government.
Boinett's replacement by an untested Brigadier Gichangi --
selected through a process that reeks of tribal cronyism and
the use of all instruments of power to stay in power through
(and beyond) the 2007 elections -- is anything but
reassuring. END SUMMARY.
OUT WITH THE OLD...
===================
2. (U) Kenya has a new spy chief. President Kibaki late
January 16 named Air Force Brigadier Michael Gichangi,
previously the director of the National Counter-Terrorism
Center, as the Director General of the National Security
Intelligence Service (NSIS). Kibaki's decision ends both the
seven-year reign of Brigadier (ret.) Wilson Boinett, and
months of jockeying to replace him.
3. (C) Boinett transformed the NSIS from a domestic political
tool into a modern professional intelligence service with an
emphasis on external threats. A former aide-de-camp to
President Moi and the last director of the Special Branch
(NSIS's predecessor, remembered darkly by most Kenyans mostly
for running the Nyayo House political detention center during
the years of one-party rule), Boinett survived not only the
1999 demise of Special Branch but also the 2002 end of the
Moi regime. Recognizing that change was needed, Boinett's
leadership garnered the NSIS domestic and international
respect for its relative apolitical nature and seriousness of
purpose. Reorganized to provide internal, external and
strategic intelligence to the President, NSIS proved to be
the USG's single-most effective Kenyan partner -- bar none --
in combating Al-Qaeda and related terrorist threats in Kenya.
4. (S) But, in the end, the die was cast for Boinett's
undoing at his birth: he was born into the wrong tribe. An
ethnic Kalenjin like former President Moi, Boinett was
distrusted from the start of the Kibaki administration by
many of those Kikuyu tribesmen closest to President Kibaki.
Boinett undoubtedly made matters worse by telling Kibaki and
his advisors news they did not like to hear -- that Kenya
remains vulnerable to al-Qaeda attacks, that tribal conflicts
were resurfacing in rural areas, that President Kibaki's
Banana team would lose November's constitutional referendum,
etc.
5. (S) The last straw, it appears, was the referendum.
Boinett rebuffed efforts to reallocate NSIS resources to aid
the Banana campaign (reftel). The Banana team did indeed
lose, and by a huge margin. In recent weeks, Boinett was
repeatedly refused access to President Kibaki -- for the
first time in his tenure.
...AND IN WITH THE NEW
======================
6. (C) As fate would have it, word of Gichangi's appointment
reached Boinett and many senior NSIS officials as they -- and
Gichangi -- were dining at the Ambassador's residence with a
visiting Codel from the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. The NSIS officials -- and a visibly angry
Police Commissioner Ali -- departed dinner "en masse" just as
soon as was diplomatically acceptable. (Ali privately relayed
he is concerned about the police's future working
relationship with the NSIS -- as he himself has had no such
working relationship with Gichangi during the latter's two
years as NCTC Director.) Gichangi began showing up for work
at NSIS the next morning.
BOINETT'S WORDS TO LIVE (AND SPY) BY:
=====================================
7. (U) Boinett's farewell remarks January 17 to the NSIS rank
and file received widespread press coverage. In a thoughtful
and respectful speech, Boinett relayed what he called "five
attributes of great consequence" for the managing and
sustaining a robust intelligence service. What lessons
Boinett chose to pass on to his troops speak volumes about
the man -- and his concerns for the future of the NSIS. They
thus bear repeating.
8. (U) ONE: The government should continuously invest in
"the character of their gatekeepers and its watchdogs." TWO:
The NSIS Director General "should have direct and unfettered
access to the Head of State and Government. In order to earn
trust, he has to do things right and the right thing without
fear, favor or ill will. In so doing, he must be efficient,
loyal and balanced." THREE: "All men and women of the
service must direct all their time and energy towards
promoting and projecting that which only serves and informs
the national interest. FOUR: The Service should operate
within the law." FIVE: The Intelligence Service is a
national insurance for counterintelligence. Yet a balance
has to be struck between the national security interests and
international threats and challenges. Information-sharing
with other nation states has been the practice from time
immemorial. These partnerships will need to be maintained,
taking into consideration mutual respect, national interests,
international law and the nature of power and its influence
in a globalized environment."
BIO NOTES
=========
9 (C) BIO NOTE: Brigadier Michael Gichangi is an ethnic
Kikuyu, the President's tribe which (along with the smaller,
affiliated Embu and Meru tribes from the Mt. Kenya area) has
an increasing lock on major power positions in the Kibaki
government. Gichangi is reportedly close to both Cabinet
Secretary Muthaura and former Security Minister Christopher
SIPDIS
Murungaru. During his just-concluded tenure as head of the
National Counter-Terrorism Center, Gichangi fought tooth and
nail against the creation of a Joint Terrorism Task Force
designed to bring police, prosecutors and intelligence
experts into a joint team. Relatively new to NSIS, Gichangi
is as well-known for being a political operator as he is a
military professional.
10. (U) BIO NOTE (Cont.): Gichangi was born September 9,
1958 in Kirinyaga District, Central Province. A Mang'u High
School Alumni, Gichangi joined the Kenyan Air Force as an F-5
pilot in 1977. In 1982 he became an F-5 instructor. From
1986-1991, Gichangi served as a staff officer (planning) at
KDoD Headquarters, Nairobi. He worked in a UN observer force
in Iraq, 1992-93. He served as an instructor at the Defence
Staff College, 1993-96 in Karen, Nairobi. From 1996-97,
Gichangi served as a commanding officer of the Air Force's
Flying Wing. He then served as Commander of the Laikipia Air
Base, 1997-2001, before being appointed chief of strategic
plans and policy at KDoD Headquarters, where he helped draft
the first version of KDoD's "White Paper" on national defense
strategy. He has spent the past two years as the founding
Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center.
COMMENT
=======
11. (C) COMMENT: Boinett is just the latest of a series of
competent professionals forced out of the Kibaki
administration. Anti-corruption czar John Githongo left last
year, frustrated at every turn. Chief Prosecutor Philip
Murgor was sacked last May for similar efforts to pursue high
crimes. And now Boinett, responsible for the transformation
of NSIS into one of Africa's premier, and apolitical, intel
services is shown the door. While Gichangi might surprise
us, the methods involved in replacing Boinett with a Kikuyu
widely expected to be a willing accomplice in responding to
political pressures from State House -- perhaps taking NSIS
back towards the days of the Special Branch -- is troubling.
It is the latest in a long line of post-referendum
appointments to let tribe trump talent. State House is
increasingly willing to drop public pretense as those around
President Kibaki angle to do whatever it takes to ensure they
stay in power through 2007 -- and beyond. Post has let State
House know privately that, though this was purely a sovereign
decision for Kenya to make, the choice of Gichangi, and the
manner of his appointment, puts at risk continued success in
our highest joint priority, counter-terrorism.
BELLAMY
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